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Abstract. During Financial Cryptography 2012 Chan et al. presented a novel
privacy-protection fault-tolerant data aggregation protocol. Comparing to pre-
vious work, their scheme guaranteed provable privacy of individuals and could
work even if some number of users refused to participate.
In our paper we demonstrate that despite its merits, their method provides unac-
ceptably low accuracy of aggregated data for a wide range of assumed parameters
and cannot be used in majority of real-life systems. To show this we use both an-
alytic and experimental methods.
Additionally, we present a precise data aggregation protocol that provides prov-
able level of security even when facing massive failures of nodes. Moreover, the
protocol requires significantly less computation (limited exploiting of heavy cryp-
tography) than most of currently known fault tolerant aggregation protocols and
offers better security guarantees that make it suitable for systems of limited re-
sources (including sensor networks). To obtain our result we relax however the
model and allow some limited communication between the nodes.
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1 Introduction
Aggregation of data is a fundamental problem that has been approached from different
perspectives. Recently there were many papers published, that presented methods of
data aggregation that preserve privacy of individual users. More precisely, the goal of
the protocol is to reveal some general aggregated statistics (like an average value) while
keeping value of each individual secret, even if the aggregator is untrusted (e.g., tries to
learn input of individual users). The general notion is to design a protocol that allows
the aggregator to learn a perturbed sum, but no intermediate results.
In [1] Shi et al. have introduced a new approach to aggregation of information in
distributed systems based on combining cryptographic techniques and typical “methods
of differential privacy” , that was originally used for protecting privacy of individuals
in statistical data bases after some data was revealed. The privacy preservation is usu-
ally realized by adding some carefully prepared noise to the aggregated values. Similar
approach has been independently proposed in [2].
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Those papers put a new light on the problem of privacy preserving data aggregation
– the authors constructed a protocol that can be very useful, however its applicability
is limited to some narrow class of scenarios due to few shortcomings. One of them is
the fact that all of the members of a group of users have to cooperate to compute the
aggregated data. Thus, this approach is not appropriate for a dynamic, real-life systems
(e.g. mobile sensor networks), even though it seems to be a perfect solution for fixed,
small system of devices, where a series of data is generated periodically for a long time
and the number of failures is always small (e.g. collecting measurements of electricity
consumption in a neighborhood).
Another important protocol, called Binary Protocol, has been introduced in [3], wherein
authors presented the first privacy preserving aggregation protocol that is, to some ex-
tent, fault tolerant. In our paper we focus on showing some shortcomings of the solution
from [3] (by pointing out the extent to which it is fault tolerant) as well as present our
approach to privacy preserving and fault tolerant data aggregation.
1.1 Our Contribution and Organization of the Paper
In Subsect. 2 we briefly describe the model assumed in our paper and provide some
notation used throughout it as well as introduce some definitions we use further on.
In Sect. 3 we recall the Binary Protocol by Chan et al. presented in [3], followed by
discussion of its disadvantages in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we present and analyze our protocol
addressing some of the Binary Protocol’s issues. Sect. 6 is devoted to recalling some
of the previous work related to the problem addressed in the paper. Finally, in Sect. 7
we conclude and indicate some possible future work. The contribution of our paper is
twofold.
– We show that the fault tolerant protocol from [3] (called Binary Protocol) offers
very low level of accuracy of aggregated data even for small number of faults for
any reasonable size of the network. This holds despite very good asymptotic guar-
antees.
– On the positive side we construct a modified protocol that offers much better ac-
curacy and significantly lower computational requirements. We assume however
a weaker security model where users may trust a few others and we allow some
limited, local communication between users. This assumption is justified in vari-
ous scenarios, specifically when users have some local knowledge about few other
participants. This is a natural assumption in electricity meters, where privacy con-
cerns is that the adversary can deduce i.e. the sleep/work habits or the number of
inhabitants in the household. Your neighbors knows your habits anyway. Similarly,
in cloud services or social network, where you naturally have some friends or users
to whom you give your data on your own free will. More precisely, all my neigh-
bors/friends can beak my privacy cooperating easier then any outer party.
2 Definitions and Tools
Below we present some definitions and facts that will be used throughout this paper.
We will denote the set of real numbers by R, integers by Z and natural numbers by N.
Definition 1. (Symmetric Geometric Distribution). Let α > 1. We denote by Geom(α)
the symmetric geometric distribution that takes integer values such that the probability
mass function at k ∈ Z is α−1α+1 · α−|k|.
Fact 1 (From [3]) Let  > 0. Let u, v be integers such that |u − v| ≤ ∆ for fixed
∆ ∈ N+ . Let r be a random variable having distribution Geom(exp( ∆ )). Then for
any integer k
Pr[v + r = k] ≤ exp() Pr[u+ r = k].
Definition 2. (Diluted Geometric Distribution). Let α > 1 and 0 < β ≤ 1. A random
variable has β-diluted Geometric distribution Geomβ(α) if with probability β it is
sampled from Geom(α), and with probability 1− β is set to 0.
In the same manner as in [3], we use computational differential privacy as a measure
of privacy protection. This notion has been introduced (in a similar form) in [4] and is
in fact a computational counterpart of differential privacy from [5].
Definition 3. (Computational Differential Privacy Against Compromise (from [3])) Sup-
pose the users are compromised by some underlying randomized process C, and we use
C to denote the information obtained by the adversary from the compromised users. Let
ε, δ > 0. A (randomized) protocol Π preserves computational (ε, δ)-differential pri-
vacy (against the compromising process C) if there exists a negligible function η : N→
R+ such that for all λ ∈ N, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for all vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}n
that differ only at position i, for all probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines A,
for any output b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
Ci
[A (Π (λ, x) , C) = b] ≤ eε Pr
Ci
[A (Π (λ, x) , C) = b] + δ + η (λ) ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A, Π and Ci, which denotes the
underlying compromising process conditioning on the event that user i is uncompro-
mised.
In a similar manner to regular differential privacy, we say that protocol Π preserves
computational ε-differential privacy if it preserves computational (ε, 0)-differential pri-
vacy. The intuition behind this definition is as follows. Every party has some bit b. From
observing some processing of data, it is not feasible for any computationally bounded
adversary to learn too much about b. This should hold with probability at least 1− δ.
3 Protocol by Chan et al. – Description
In the paper [3] authors propose a fault tolerant, privacy preserving data aggregation
protocol which they named Binary Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to allow
some untrusted Aggregator AGG, to learn the sum of values xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
where xi is kept by the i-th user. We will denote i-th user by Ni. The idea is based
on earlier work [1], in particular the Block Aggregation protocol. In this setting, we do
not have a trusted party who can collect the data and perform some specific actions to
preserve privacy (i.e. add noise of appropriate magnitude). The users themselves have
to be responsible for securing their privacy by adding noise from some specific distribu-
tion, encrypting the noisy value and sending it to the Aggregator. This problem requires
combination of both cryptographic and privacy preserving techniques. See that we have
essentially two adversaries here. First is an external one, against whom we have to use
cryptography to protect the communication between users and the Aggregator. This ex-
ternal adversary should not be able to decipher anything, including noisy sum of all
data. On the other hand, the Aggregator himself is an adversary as well. This adversary,
however, should be able to decrypt only the noisy sum (not the single user noisy val-
ues) and should not be able to compromise the privacy of any single user. The general
notion behind Block Aggregation is to generate a random secret key ski for each of n
users as well as an additional sk0 given to the Aggregator, such that
∑n
i=0 ski = 0.
Before sending the encrypted data, i-th user adds noise ri coming from Diluted Geo-
metric Distribution (Def. 2 in Sect. 2). We will denote the noisy data of i-th user by
x˜i = xi + ri. Namely, each user transmits Encski (x˜i) so that upon receiving all shares
and having sk0, the secret keys cancel out and the Aggregator is left with the desired
noisy sum. One may easily note that as long as each user transmits its value,AGGmay
use sk0 to decipher the sum. The symmetric geometric distribution Geom(α) can be
viewed as a discrete version of Laplace distribution, which is widely used in differen-
tial privacy papers. Having discrete values is essential for the cryptography part of the
protocol. The dilution parameter β is the probability that a specific user will add noise
from Geom(α). This is done because, intuitively, we want at least one user to add a ge-
ometric noise, but we do not want too many of these noises to keep the necessary noise
sufficiently small. The problem that occurred with so-called Block Aggregation is that
whenever a single user fails to deliver their share (and what is really important – their
ski), the blindings do not cancel out, hence making it impossible for the Aggregator to
decipher the desired value.
Binary Protocol presented in [3] addresses the incompleteness of the data by ar-
ranging the users in a virtual binary tree. One may visualize each user as a leaf of
a binary tree, with all the tree-nodes up to the root being virtual. The Aggregator is
identified with an additional tree-node, which is located “above” the root and is con-
nected only to the tree-root. In order to simulate the tree structure, the users and AGG
are equipped with appropriate secret keys and generate random noises for each of the
tree-layer, where layer is equivalent to the depth the tree-node is at, i.e., the first layer
consists of root, second layer consists of two direct children of the root, and so on. Fi-
nally, at the dlog ne+1st layer consists of the leaves. Finally, each user performs Block
Aggregation protocol for each of the layers, i.e., they generate their block Encski (x˜i)
for the dlog ne + 1st layer and their shares for larger blocks of higher layers. In each
of the layers, the noise ri is taken from a different distribution, namely β parameter for
diluted geometric distribution is derived as follows: β = min
(
1
|B| ln
1
δ0
, 1
)
, where |B|
is the number of tree-nodes in the layer and δ0 > 0 is a privacy parameter. One may
note that, the more tree-nodes in the layer, the blinding becomes sparser. If all users
present their shares the problem is reduced to the original Block Aggregation. Namely,
the Aggregator may decrypt the root-layer block, obtaining the sum of all the x˜i with
the blinding canceled out. However, if at least one user Ni fails, all the blocks contain-
ing Ni will suffer the same issues as Block Aggregation with a missing user. Namely,
large, uncanceled random disturbance. In order to provide the aggregation of the work-
ing users, the authors allow the Aggregator to find such a covering of the tree from the
blocks of different layers that all the working users are covered, none of the failed users
is included and that AGG is able to recover the result.
Binary Protocol provides security under computational differential privacy model
and results in O(n log n) communications exchanged in the network and guarantees
O˜
(
(log n)
3
2
)
error. This notion hides significant constants. Nevertheless in a practical
setting, those results are less satisfying than one would expect. The issues concerning
the privacy and the resulting error are raised in Sect. 4.
4 Analysis of Chan et al.’s Protocol – The Magnitude of Error
In this section we will show that the error magnitude in Binary Protocol is significant
for moderate number of participants. Note that in [3] the authors assumed that each
user has data xi ∈ {0, 1}, which means that the range of the sum of aggregated data
is [0, n]. Thus, error of magnitude γn shall be regarded large already for moderate
constant γ. They have also shown that the magnitude of error is o(n) asymptotically.
However, in practical applications we are also interested in performance of this protocol
for moderate values of n, i.e. n 6 214. We will show that for a reasonable range of
values of the number of users n and number of failures κ the error is large (γn for
some constant γ) with significant probability. Obviously, as the n increases, the Binary
Protocol becomes better because of the asymptotic guarantees. However, our aim here is
to show, that if the number of participants is at most moderate (i.e. 212) or the number of
failures is significant (i.e. κ = log2(n), κ = b n26 c) then the accuracy of Binary Protocol
is too low to be used. Furthermore, if the number of users is quite small (i.e. 210 or less),
then even for κ = 5 the errors generated are unacceptably high.
We aim to show a precise magnitude of error in the Binary Protocol. To achieve
this, we will use some subtler method than these presented by the authors of [3]. To
support our analytic analysis we show results of simulations. Note that in [3] the authors
described only simulations without failures, even though their protocol is specifically
designed to handle failed users.
4.1 Analytical Approach
The size of error depends on the number of failed users and the way they are dis-
tributed amongst all participants. Let us fix n as the number of participants. Like the
authors of [3], we assume for simplicity that n is a power of 2. Our reasoning can be
however generalized for every n. We also assume that κ users have failed. We assume
that these failed users are uniformly distributed amongst all participants, which seems
to be reasonable in most scenarios. The error generated during the Binary Protocol is
the sum of all noises in the aggregated blocks. Throughout this section we will use
following notation, δ0 = δblog2(n)c+1 , where δ is a privacy parameter. Also we have
βi = min
(
1
|Bi| ln
1
δ0
, 1
)
, where Bi is size of the node on ith level of the tree. Because
we assumed that n is a power of 2, so the binary tree is full, then Bi is essentially the
number of leaves being descendants of any node on ith level of the tree. In our analysis,
first we show an exact formula for the expected value of the number of noises added by
individual nodes. The exact formula is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Y be a random variable which denotes the number of noises added
during the Binary Protocol. Let κ > 0 and fix n as the number of participants. Then,
the expected value of random variable Y is given by the following formula:
EY = n− κ+ n ·
log2(n)−1∑
i=1
((
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) · (βi − βi+1)) ,
where βi = min
(
1
|Bi| ln
1
δ0
, 1
)
.
Proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix. It is based on combinatorial and prob-
abilistic techniques. Now we show a lower bound for this value for limited range of n.
We present it in the following
Lemma 1. Let 24 6 n 6 221 and δ = 0.05, then EY has a following lower bound:
EY > n− κ− n ·
(
e−
8κ
n +
ln( log2(n)+1δ )
8
·
(
e−
16κ
n − e− 8κn
))
.
Note that if n < 24 then we have βi = 0, which means that every remaining user
has to add noise (even if there are no failures, i.e κ = 0). There is no need to give a
lower bound in that case, because then the number of noisy inputs is exactly n − κ.
Note also that even though we fixed a specific δ that is used broadly in previous papers
(including [3]), similar reasoning can be made for different values of δ.
We can use this bound to obtain a following
Corollary 1. Fix δ = 0.05. For n 6 210 and κ = log2(n), we have EY > 0.1n.
Similarly, if κ = b n26 c, then for 26 6 n 6 212 we have EY > 0.16n.
This comes immediately from Lemma 1 and an observation that EYn is a decreasing
function of n. After plugging the greatest value of n that is allowed by assumptions we
obtain these bounds.
Having an exact formula and also a lower bound for the expected number of noises
generated, we can calculate the error. Let us assume that we have m noises generated.
Recall that each of them comes from symmetric geometric distribution Geom(α) with
α > 1, which is comprehensively described both in [1] and [3]. We denote the sum
of all noises as Z. One can easily see that EZ = 0 due to symmetry of distribution.
However the expected additional error i.e., E|Z| might be, and we will show that it
often is, quite large.
Theorem 2. Consider Binary Protocol with fixed α, let m denote the number of noises
generated, each coming from Geom(α) distribution. Then let Z be a random variable
which denotes the sum of generated noises. We have
E|Z| =
∞∫
0
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt.
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix. It is based on techniques compre-
hensively described in [6]. We also show a lower bound for E|Z| in a following
Lemma 2. For fixed n and , which is a privacy parameter, provided thatα = log2(n)+1
and m = γn, for γ ∈ [0, 1] we have
E|Z| > cn, · √γ · log2(n) ·
√
n

√
pi
− 0.1 ,
where cn, is a constant, which is at least 1.4 for moderate values of n and .
Having all useful theorems and lemmas we can obtain a following
Corollary 2. Consider Binary Protocol for δ = 0.05,  = 0.5, n 6 210 and κ =
log2(n). Let |Z| be the absolute value of all noises aggregated during this protocol.
We have E|Z| > 0.15 · n. Moreover, if we take κ = n26 and 26 6 n 6 212 we have
E|Z| > 0.12 · n.
This is an immediate result from Lemma. 2, we can see that E|Z|n is a decreasing func-
tion of n, so it is enough to plug n = 210 into lower bound for E|Z| for the first part of
the corollary and n = 212 for the second part of the corollary.
This clearly shows that even if we consider the lower bound for the number of
noises and their magnitude, the Binary Protocol is far from perfect for many realistic
scenarios, i.e. when the number of participants is moderate. Even worse conclusions
will be drawn in Subsect. 4.2, where we use the exact formulas given in Theorems 1
and 2 to numerically analyze the errors generated in this protocol.
4.2 Experimental Approach
In Subsect. 4.1 we gave both exact formulas and lower bounds for the number of noises
generated and their sum. Note that the lower bounds are not very tight for many n.
In this subsection we will show that the errors generated are, in fact, even larger. We
will use the exact formulas to precisely calculate the errors numerically. First let us
consider the case where n 6 210, κ = blog2(n)c, and privacy parameters are  = 0.5,
δ = 0.05. See Fig. 1. It clearly shows that the error magnitude in Binary Protocol
is, in fact, significantly greater than the lower bound given in Corollary 2. Now let
26 6 n 6 212, κ = n26 and privacy parameters stays the same. See Fig. 2. Again we
can see that the error magnitude is unacceptably high, greater than 0.2n. Note that the
noise is independent from the data, so such error could be very problematic, especially
if the sum of the real data is small (e.g o(n)). In such case the noise could be greater
than the data itself. We can also check how great the errors will be for constant value of
κ = 5. See Fig. 3.
4.3 Some Other Shortcomings
Note that in [3], but also in numerous other papers concerning data aggregation with
untrusted aggregator, we have a constant privacy parameter δ (i.e. δ = 0.05). This
Fig. 1. Error magnitude in Binary Protocol with  = 0.5, δ = 0.05 and κ = blog2(n)c.
Fig. 2. Error magnitude in Binary Protocol with  = 0.5, δ = 0.05 and κ =
⌊
n
26
⌋
.
Fig. 3. Error magnitude in Binary Protocol with  = 0.5, δ = 0.05 and κ = 5.
significantly decreases the amount of noises generated, but is fundamentally incorrect in
terms of classic differential privacy standards. Such approach allows choosing δ fraction
of the database and revealing their data to everyone. In fact, the magnitude of δ should
be o( 1n ), where n is the number of users. This is necessary to ensure that the probability
of leakage is negligible. More information about this can be found in [7]. Furthermore,
we assumed that no participants collude with the aggregator. We used the same regime
as in [1] with γ being a lower bound for fraction of non-colluding participants, the
magnitude of added noises would be even greater.
5 Precise Aggregation Algorithm with Local Communication
In this part we present an alternative protocol PAALEC (Precise Aggregation Algo-
rithm with Local Communication) that in some scenarios offers much better accuracy
of aggregated data when failures occur, while preserving high level of users’ privacy
protection. In fact our protocol works in a substantially different way and for slightly
modified model. Thus, despite its performance and accuracy that outperforms the orig-
inal protocol of Chan at al., they are not fully comparable.
First of all, we assume that users may communicate (also in order to bypass the
lower bound pointed out in [8]). Let us stress that the communication is limited to a
small circle of “neighbors”. The idea behind the presented construction is to take advan-
tage of some natural structures emerging in distributed systems (e.g. social networks)
wherein, apart from logical connections between each user and a server/aggregator there
are also some direct links between individual users. Clearly, such model is not adequate
for some real-life problems discussed in [3], for example in sensor fields with unidirec-
tional communication. Thus there are applications where the original protocol from [3]
is the only one possible.
5.1 Modified Model
We assume that the network consists of n users - V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} as well as the
aggregator AGG and a set of k < n local aggregators Agg1, . . . , Aggk. Please note
that the local aggregators may be separate entities but without any significant changes
they may be selected from the set of regular users V . The only issue with this approach
is that we have to ensure that the local aggregator is either selected during the aggrega-
tion round or it cannot fail during a single execution of aggregation process. We assume
that each user is assigned to exactly one local aggregator. We denote the set of nodes
assigned to the local aggregator Aggi by Vi. An example of the network’s topology is
depicted in Fig. 4.
AGG
Agg
Agg
AggAgg
Agg
Fig. 4. Example of a clusterized network with global aggregator (AGG) and local ag-
gregators (Agg) marked.
We can derive a graph G = (V, E) from the network structure, where V are all the
nodes and the set of edges is created based on the ability to establish communication
(e.g., transmission range in a sensor network, friendship relation in a social network).
Namely, the edge {v, v′} ∈ E if and only if v and v′ are neighbors and can communi-
cate via a private channel. In our protocol we assume that each node can perform some
basic cryptographic operations and has access to a source of randomness. By N(v)
we denote a set of such vertices v′ of G that the edge {v, v′} ∈ E. Security of the
protocol described in Section 5.3 depends on the structure of graph G, and how many
parties the adversary can corrupt. Discussion on security of the protocol can be found
in Section 5.4.
Adversary. The adversary may corrupt a subsets of users, local aggregators and the
aggregator. It can read all messages the controlled parties sent or received. The aim of
the adversary is to learn about individual contributions of uncorrupted users.
5.2 Building Blocks
Similarly to previous papers, for obtaining high level of data privacy we combine cryp-
tographic techniques with data perturbation methods typical for research concentrated
on differential privacy of databases.
The first technique we use in our protocol is a homomorphic encryption scheme
based on original ElGamal construction enriched by some extra techniques introduced
in [9]. More precisely, encrypted messages can be “aggregated” and re-encrypted. More-
over one can “add” an extra encryption layer to a given ciphertext, in such way that the
message can be decrypted only using both respective keys. Clearly this operation pre-
serves the homomorphic property.
LetG be a group such that the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. Let g be a generator
of G. Let sk, sk′ be a some private keys and gsk, gsk
′
are respective public keys.
Encryption of ’1’ A pair Encsk (1) = (gr, gr·sk) for a random r ∈ G is an encryption
of 1.
Re-encryption Ciphertext representing 1 can be re-encrypted. Namely, one can get an-
other ciphertext representing one, without private key. Namely havingEncsk (1) =
(gr, gr·sk) one can choose r′ and compute Re(Encsk (1)) = (gr·r
′
, gr·r
′·sk) that
represents 1 as well.
Adding layer of encryption Having a ciphertext Encsk (1) = (gr, gr·sk) a party hav-
ing private key sk′ can “add encryption layer” to a ciphertext obtaining
Encsk+sk′ (1) = ((g
r)r
′
, (gr·sk)r
′ · (gr)r′sk′) = (gr·r′ , gr·r′·(sk+sk′)).
Filling the ciphertext Having Encsk (1) = (gr, gr·sk) one can compute
Encsk+sk′ (C) = (g
r, gr·sk · C).
Partial decryption Having Encsk (C) = (gr·r
′
, gr·r
′·(sk+sk′)C) and a private key sk′
one can “remove one layer of encryption” and obtain
Encsk (C) =
(
gr·r
′
,
gr·r
′·(sk+sk′)C
(gr·r′)sk′
)
= (gr·r
′
, gr·r
′·skC).
For the sake of clarity we skip some technical details (i.e., choice of the group size,
generators etc.) as well as full security discussion of this encryption scheme. Note that
these are quite standard techniques used in many papers including [9,10].
Similarly to previous papers (including [3,1]) we utilize the following method: if
we know that each user v ∈ V has a value from an interval of moderate size ξv ∈ [0, ∆]
then the sum of values of all ξv’s cannot exceed n∆. Thus one can find a discreet
logarithm for g
∑
v∈V ξv even if finding a discreet logarithm of gr is not feasible if r is
a random element of G. Using Pollard’s Rho method this can be completed in average
time O(
√
n∆).
5.3 Protocol Description
During the protocol, we assume that the aggregator AGG has a private key sk, more-
over each of the local aggregators Aggi has its own private key ski. We also assume
that there is a public parameter g, that is a generator of some finite group G, in which
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. By Encsk (c) we denote the encryption structure in-
troduced in Section 5.2. Let us assume that each user v has a private value ξv from the
range [0, ∆]. The final aim is to provide AGG the sum
∑
v∈V ξv perturbed in such
way that the privacy (expressed in terms of differential privacy) of all v ∈ V is pre-
served. Clearly, the privacy of users can be endangered both by reveling the output as
well as by collecting information about the aggregation process.
Setup
– AGG broadcasts to the local aggregators Encsk (1).
– Each of the local aggregators Aggi constructs Encsk+ski (1) and publishes it
for all users from Vi.
The setup phase is performed only once during network’s lifetime. Moreover if
needed, each Aggi may provide a non-interactive proof that the operations were
performed correctly and honestly [11,12].
Aggregation
Algorithm for node v
– For each node v′ ∈ N(v) generate a random value xvv′ ∈ G.
– Using a private channel send each value xvv′ to the appropriate neighbor v′.
– Having received all xv
′
v from each of the neighbors, select random rv from
Geomβ(α) and calculate
cv =
∑
v′∈N(v)
xv
′
v −
∑
v′∈N(v)
xvv′ + rv + ξv.
– Compute Re(Encsk+ski (gcv)) and send it to Aggi.
An example of node’s communication is shown in Fig. 5.
Algorithm for local aggregator Aggi
– Having received Encsk+ski (gcv) from all nodes from Vi, compute
Encsk (g
cv) =
(
gri ,
gri(sk+ski)+cv
gri·ski
)
.
This operations result in obtaining shares
Encsk (g
cv1 ) = (grv1 , grv1 ·sk+cv1 ), . . . , Encsk (gcvl ) = (grvl , grvl ·sk+cvl )
of all l = |Vi| users from |Vi|.
– Compute
Encsk
(
gcv1+···+cvl
)
=
(
l∏
i=1
gri ,
l∏
i=1
grisk+cvi
)
=
(
g
∑l
i=1 ri , g(
∑l
i=1 ri)sk+
∑l
i=1 cvi
)
.
– Send the value Encsk
(
gcv1+···+cvl
)
to the aggregator AGG.
Final aggregation
– Having received the aggregated values from each Vi, for each of those
values AGG calculate yi = g
∑
v∈Vi cv , using its private key sk for each
i = 1, . . . , k. Then compute
y =
k∏
i
yi =
∏
i
g
∑
v∈Vi cvi = g
∑
v∈V cvi .
– Then AGG compute discrete logarithm of y as a final (perturbed) value
being a sum of all
∑
v∈V ξv .
Note that the protocol depends on two security parameters β and α. They strongly
depend on the topology of the underlying graph. We discuss this issue in the next sub-
section.
5.4 Comparison and Analysis
In this section we outline the analysis of the presented aggregation protocol with re-
spect to correctness, level of privacy provided and error of the result obtained by the
aggregator. The analysis is slightly more complicated since the parameters of the proto-
col strongly depend on the underlying network. We argue however that they offer very
good properties for wide classes of networks.
Correctness First, let us look at the result obtained by the aggregator AGG in the last
step of the protocol. This is a discrete logarithm of g
∑
v∈V cvi . Let us observe that
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v
Agg
xvv1
xv1v
xvv2
xv2v
xvv3
xv3v
xvv4
xv4v
xvv5
xv5v
Re(Encsk+ski (g
cv ))
Fig. 5. An example of communication in a single aggregation round from a perspective
of node v. The dotted line marks the set of nodes assigned to a single local aggregator
Agg. Note that neighbors may may have different local aggregators.
∑
v∈V
cv =
∑
v∈V
 ∑
v′∈N(v)
xv
′
v −
∑
v′∈N(v)
xvv′ + rv + ξv

=
∑
v∈V
∑
v′∈N(v)
xv
′
v −
∑
v∈V
∑
v′∈N(v)
xvv′ +
∑
v∈V
ξv +
∑
v∈V
rv =
∑
v∈V
ξv +
∑
v∈V
rv.
The value
∑
v∈V ξv is the exact sum of values kept by nodes and sum of all the noises∑
v∈V rv . This leads to two conclusions. First, the result is correct. Second, retrieving
the data using Pollard’s Rho method (or even brute force method) is feasible since the
absolute value of the first sum has to be smaller than n∆. One can easy see that the sum
of added noises is of the magnitudeO(n)with high probability (as a sum of independent
geometric distributions).
Privacy protection We assume that the encryption scheme Encsk () is semantically se-
cure. In particular after re-encryption operation one cannot retrieve any non-trivial in-
formation about the plaintext without the private key sk possibly except some negligible
probability η (λ) with respect to the key-length λ or some other security parameters. In
particular, in our protocol, the local aggregator AGGi cannot learn the contributions
sent to AGGj for i 6= j without access to keys skj and sk.
For the simplicity of analysis of the privacy protection let us consider the sim-
plest case when k = 1, i.e. there is only one aggregator. In such case we may assume
AGG1 = AGG. Let V H ⊂ V be the set of uncompromised users. Note that all neigh-
boring users exchange a purely random values xv
′
v ’s that finally cancel-out, however as
long as they remain unknown to the adversary, they perfectly obfuscate the results sent
to the aggregator (exactly in the same manner as the one-time pad cipher ). This can be
easily adopted to our protocol to get the following fact.
Fact 2 Let us assume that the adversary can control AGG and a subset of users
V \ V H . Let S be a connected component of the subgraph of G = (V,E) induced
by the subset V H . Then, the adversary can learn nothing but
∑
v∈S(ξv + rv) about the
values ξv’s from the execution of PAALEC for any v ∈ V H .
Theorem 3. Let us assume that PAALEC with parameter α = exp( ∆ ) is executed in
the network represented by a graph G = (V,E) and G′ is a subgraph of G induced by
the set of uncompromised users V H . Moreover we assume that each user v contributes
a value ξv ∈ [0, ∆].
If in each connected component S of G′ there is a user s, such that its added
noise r is taken from Geom(exp( ∆ )), then PAALEC preserves computational (ε, 0)-
differential privacy.
Proof. Let Ξ =
∑
s∈S ξs and let Ξ
′ be the same sum with changed a single value ξs.
By the assumption about the range of the aggregated values we get |Ξ ′−Ξ| ≤ ∆. Let r
be a random variable taken from the symmetric geometric distributionGeom(exp( ∆ )).
From Fact 1 we know that Pr[Ξ + r = k] may differ from Pr[Ξ ′ + r = k] by at most
a multiplicative factor exp(). However, from Fact 2 we know that the adversary may
learn nothing more than the sum of all values from the component S. To complete the
proof it is enough to recall that we assumed that probability of gaining some other
knowledge if weak parameters of the cipher are chosen is at most negligible function
η (λ).
From this theorem follows next corollary.
Corollary 3. If PAALEC is executed on a graph such that a subgraph induced by the
set of uncompromised users V H is connected and with probability at least 1 − δ at
least one uncompromised users adds its value r from Geom(exp( ∆ )) then PAALEC
computationally preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Translating into real terms Theorem 3 with Corollary 3 say if the connections be-
tween honest users are enough dense and we can somehow guarantee that at least one
honest node adds the noise, the system is secure. The core of the problem is judge if a
real-world networks are dense enough and what parameters of adding noise are suffi-
cient. This problem is discussed in the next paragraph.
Accuracy The level of accuracy and security in this protocol strongly depends on the
graph topology and chosen security parameters. We will consider a random graph,
where each of possible edge is independently added with probability p. Moreover the
adversary controls up to n−m randomly chosen users.
Theorem 4. Let us consider a random network with n nodes. Each of possible
(
n
2
)
connections (edges) is independently added to the network with probability p ≥ 8 lognn .
Let S be a subgraph induced by a subset of at least m ≥ n/2 randomly chosen nodes.
Then S is connected with probability at least 1− 1/n.
Note that the presented model boils down to the classic Erdo˝s-Rényi model [13].
For the sake of completeness and to get explicit constants we present the proof in the
appendix of the full version of our paper [14].
From Theorem 4 we learn that a “typical” network of n nodes with random connec-
tions such that the average number of neighbors is 8 log n = Θ(log n) is dense enough
even if the adversary is able to compromise as much as n/2 nodes.
If we have guaranteed at least n/2 honest (uncompromised and working) nodes one
may note that the probability that none of them adds the noise is at least (1 − β)n/2.
To have (1 − β)n/2 ≤ δ one needs to have β such that log(1 − β) ≤ 2 log δn . Since
log(1 + x) ≤ x for x > −1 it is enough to use β ≥ 2 log(1/δ)n . Clearly the expected
error cannot exceed 2
√
log(1/δ) for β = 2 log(1/δ)n . Using standard methods one can
also show that the expected error is concentrated.
Remarks and Extensions We proved that the proposed protocol guarantees a very good
accuracy even facing a massive failures and compromising of nodes. Half of nodes
may failed or cooperate with the adversary (In fact this result can be generalized to any
constant fraction of users). The analysis and the model can be relaxed/extended in many
directions. One can instantly observe that the analysis can be extended for smaller δ for
the price of moderate increasing of the expected noise. Note that the value of δ set to a
celebrated magic constant 0.05 seems to be definitely too big for practice. Indeed, this
implies that one out of each 20 may loos its privacy.
We believe that this approach can be useful for other graphs-including those rep-
resenting social networks. Note that if a graph guarantees a specific level of privacy
then more dense graph (with some added edges) offers at least the same level of pri-
vacy. Thus it is enough if each users adds something like Θ(log n) “randomly” chosen
neighbors to protect the privacy in any network.
Note that our protocol is not immune against an adversarial nodes that sends in-
coherent random data. To the best of our knowledge all protocols of this type (includ-
ing [3,1]) are prone to so called contaminating attacks. To mitigate this problem as in
other cases one may apply orthogonal methods presented in [15].
6 Previous and Related Work
Data aggregation in distributed networks has been thoroughly studied due to practical
importance of such protocols. Measuring the target environment, aggregating data and
rising alarm are arguably three most important functionalities of distributed sensing
networks, and with the increased number of personal mobile devices, the aggregation
becomes of greatest interest among the three. Exemplary protocols that do not address
security nor privacy may be found in [16,17], with the latter being often presented as a
model aggregation algorithm.
There are several settings considering data aggregation. They differ in both, the abili-
ties and constraints of the nodes performing the aggregation, as well as the issues that
the algorithm addresses. Some of the adversities that may be addressed include data
confidentiality (i.e., protecting the data from disclosure), privacy of the nodes (inabil-
ity to learn exact values of each node), node failure and spontaneous node joining the
network as well as data poisoning (i.e., injecting malicious data by the adversary that
allows them to significantly influence the outcome of the algorithm or learning more
information about the execution that they would not gain when following the protocol
honestly).
Our paper follows the model considered in [3], where the nodes have constrained abil-
ities and their energy pool is limited. Authors present a privacy preserving aggregation
protocol that assumes malicious aggregator, moreover they claim tolerance for failures
and joins, hence addressing majority of the issues. Similar problems that focus on nar-
rower range of properties have been also studied in [1,2]. In [18,19] authors present
some aggregation protocols that preserve privacy, however they do not consider dy-
namic changes inside of the network. The latter also considers data poisoning attacks,
however the authors do not provide rigid proofs. A different approach was presented
in [20,21], where the authors present a framework for some aggregation functions and
consider the confidentiality of the result, however leaving nodes’ privacy out of scope of
their papers. On the other hand, there is bulk of research that focuses on fault tolerance
that leaves privacy and security issues either out of scope or just mentioned, not keeping
it as a priority. Examples of such work may be found in [22,23,24]. In [8] the authors
present an asymptotic lower bound on the error of the aggregation that preserves pri-
vacy, showing that in order to reduce the errors, one has to resign from perfect privacy
and focus rather on computational variant of the privacy preservation.
An example of work on secure data aggregation in stronger models may be found
in [25,26], where the authors consider data aggregation in a smart grid. Another fruit-
ful branch of the research on data aggregation considers data aggregation in vehicular
ad hoc networks (VANET). The research in this field is motivated by the increasing
number of „smart-cars” with internal computational unit. One of the first works ad-
dressing this issue was [27,28,29]. A practical scenario for data aggregation in VANET
has been presented in [30]. The security issue in VANET data-aggregation has been
mentioned in [31,32]. A survey of the known protocols has been performed in [33]. One
may note that retrieving encrypted or blinded data by one entity, that requires cooper-
ation of others is similar to cryptographic secret-sharing. Some of the most important
work on secret sharing may be found in [34,35], however in our paper we draw from
the Universal Re-encryption method presented in [9].
7 Conclusions
In our paper we provided a precise analysis of accuracy of the data aggregation protocol
presented in [3]. We have shown that in many cases its accuracy may not be sufficient
even if the number of faults is moderate. We constructed another fault tolerant, privacy
preserving aggregation protocol that offers much better precision. In order to obtain this,
we allowed a moderate communication between the nodes. This assumption deviates
from the classic model.
We believe that our approach and security model is justified in many real-life sce-
narios, however much research is left to be done in the field. First of all, our protocol
as well as all other similar protocols we are aware of, is not immune against so called
data poisoning attack. Another problem is finding solution for statistics other than sum.
Authors of aggregating schemes usually limit the scope of their work to sum, product
and average of the values of all nodes in the network. In many cases we need however
other statistics, e.g. minimum or the median. We suppose that finding more general
statistics with guaranteed privacy of individuals is possible using methods explored in
e-voting protocols. They however are very demanding in terms of required resources.
From the theoretical point of view the important question is about the possible trade-
offs between privacy protection, volume of communication and possible accuracy of
the results of aggregation.
References
1. Shi, E., Chow, R., Chan, T.H.H., Song, D., Rieffel, E.: Privacy-preserving aggregation of
time-series data. In: In NDSS. (2011)
2. Rastogi, V., Nath, S.: Differentially private aggregation of distributed time-series with trans-
formation and encryption. In: Proceedings of the 2010 ACM SIGMOD International Con-
ference on Management of Data. SIGMOD ’10, New York, NY, USA, ACM (2010) 735–746
3. Chan, T.H.H., Shi, E., Song, D.: Privacy-preserving stream aggregation with fault toler-
ance. In Keromytis, A.D., ed.: Financial Cryptography. Volume 7397 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science., Springer (2012) 200–214
4. Mironov, I., Pandey, O., Reingold, O., Vadhan, S.P.: Computational differential privacy. In:
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009, 29th Annual International Cryptology Confer-
ence, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16-20, 2009. Proceedings. (2009) 126–142
5. Dwork, C., McSherry, F., Nissim, K., Smith, A.: Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private
data analysis. In: Theory of Cryptography, Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC
2006, New York, NY, USA, March 4-7, 2006, Proceedings. (2006) 265–284
6. Pinelis, I.: Characteristic function of the positive part of a random variable and related results,
with applications. Statistics & Probability Letters 106 (2015) 281–286
7. Dwork, C., Roth, A.: The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy. Foundations and
Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 9(3-4) (2014) 211–407
8. Chan, T.H.H., Shi, E., Song, D.: Optimal lower bound for differentially private multi-party
aggregation. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2012 (2012) 373 informal publication.
9. Golle, P., Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Syverson, P.F.: Universal re-encryption for mixnets.
In Okamoto, T., ed.: Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2004, The Cryptographers’ Track at
the RSA Conference 2004, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 23-27, 2004, Proceedings.
Volume 2964 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science., Springer (2004) 163–178
10. Gomulkiewicz, M., Klonowski, M., Kutylowski, M.: Onions based on universal re-
encryption - anonymous communication immune against repetitive attack. In Lim, C.H.,
Yung, M., eds.: Information Security Applications, 5th International Workshop, WISA 2004,
Jeju Island, Korea, August 23-25, 2004, Revised Selected Papers. Volume 3325 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science., Springer (2004) 400–410
11. Goldreich, O., Oren, Y.: Definitions and properties of zero-knowledge proof systems. Journal
of Cryptology 7(1) (1994) 1–32
12. Blum, M., Feldman, P., Micali, S.: Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications. In:
Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. STOC
’88, New York, NY, USA, ACM (1988) 103–112
13. Janson, S., Luczak, T., Rucinski, A.: Random Graphs. Wiley Series in Discrete Mathematics
and Optimization. Wiley (2011)
14. Grining, K., Klonowski, M., Syga, P.: Practical fault-tolerant data aggregation. CoRR
abs/1602.04138 (2016). Available from: http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04138
15. Chan, H., Perrig, A., Przydatek, B., Song, D.: Sia: Secure information aggregation in sensor
networks. J. Comput. Secur. 15(1) (2007) 69–102
16. Heinzelman, W.R., Kulik, J., Balakrishnan, H.: Adaptive protocols for information dissem-
ination in wireless sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM/IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking. MobiCom ’99, New York, NY,
USA, ACM (1999) 174–185
17. Madden, S., Franklin, M.J., Hellerstein, J.M., Hong, W.: Tag: A tiny aggregation service for
ad-hoc sensor networks. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 36(SI) (2002) 131–146
18. PDA: Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation in Wireless Sensor Networks. In: INFOCOM
2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE. (2007)
19. He, W., Liu, X., Nguyen, H., Nahrstedt, K.: A cluster-based protocol to enforce integrity
and preserve privacy in data aggregation. In: ICDCS Workshops, IEEE Computer Society
(2009) 14–19
20. Roy, S., Conti, M., Setia, S., Jajodia, S.: Secure data aggregation in wireless sensor networks:
Filtering out the attacker’s impact. Trans. Info. For. Sec. 9(4) (2014) 681–694
21. Papadopoulos, S., Kiayias, A., Papadias, D.: Exact in-network aggregation with integrity
and confidentiality. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on 24(10) (2012)
1760–1773
22. Feng, Y., Tang, S., Dai, G.: Fault tolerant data aggregation scheduling with local information
in wireless sensor networks. Tsinghua Science & Technology 16(5) (2011) 451 – 463
23. Jhumka, A., Bradbury, M., Saginbekov, S.: Efficient fault-tolerant collision-free data aggre-
gation scheduling for wireless sensor networks. Journal of Parallel and Distributed Comput-
ing 74(1) (2014) 1789 – 1801
24. Larrea, M., Martin, C., Astrain, J.: Hierarchical and fault-tolerant data aggregation in wire-
less sensor networks. In: Wireless Pervasive Computing, 2007. ISWPC ’07. 2nd International
Symposium on. (2007)
25. Jawurek, M., Kerschbaum, F.: Fault-tolerant privacy-preserving statistics. In Fischer-
HÃijbner, S., Wright, M., eds.: Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Volume 7384 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2012) 221–238
26. Rottondi, C., Verticale, G., KrauÃ§, C.: Distributed privacy-preserving aggregation of me-
tering data in smart grids. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication (JSAC) -
JSAC Smart Grid Communications Series (2013)
27. Hermann: SOTIS - A Self-Organizing Traffic Information System. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference Spring. (2003) 2442–2246
28. Nadeem, T., Dashtinezhad, S., Liao, C., Iftode, L.: Trafficview: Traffic data dissemination
using car-to-car communication. SIGMOBILE Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev. 8(3) (2004)
6–19
29. Wischhof, L., Ebner, A.a., Rohling, H.: Information dissemination in Self-Organizing in-
tervehicle networks. IEEE Transactions on intelligent Transporation Systems 6(1) (2005)
90–101
30. Caliskan, M., Graupner, D., Mauve, M.: Decentralized discovery of free parking places. In:
Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks. VANET ’06,
New York, NY, USA, ACM (2006) 30–39
31. Antolino Rivas, D., Barceló-Ordinas, J.M., Guerrero Zapata, M., Morillo-Pozo, J.D.: Secu-
rity on VANETs: Privacy, misbehaving nodes, false information and secure data aggregation.
Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34(6) (2011) 1942–1955
32. Han, Q., Du, S., Ren, D., Zhu, H.: SAS: A secure data aggregation scheme in vehicular
sensing networks. In: Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications,
ICC 2010, Cape Town, South Africa, 23-27 May 2010, IEEE (2010) 1–5
33. Mohanty, S., Jena, D.: Secure data aggregation in vehicular-adhoc networks: A survey. Pro-
cedia Technology 6 (2012) 922 – 929 2nd International Conference on Communication,
Computing and Security [ICCCS-2012].
34. Benaloh, J.C.: Secret sharing homomorphisms: Keeping shares of a secret secret. In: Ad-
vances in Cryptology, Springer-Verlag (1987)
35. Beimel, A.: Secret-sharing schemes: A survey. In: Proceedings of the Third Interna-
tional Conference on Coding and Cryptology. IWCC’11, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag
(2011) 11–46
36. WolframResearch: Hypergeometric2F1. From WolframResearch (2011)
http://functions.wolfram.com/HypergeometricFunctions/
Hypergeometric2F1.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Consider Binary Protocol described in ??. We aim to give a precise formula for
the expected value of the number of noises added in this protocol. For simplicity we
assume that n is the power of 2. We also assume that κ leaves have failed, and they
are uniformly chosen from all n leaves. We will use random variables Xi to denote the
number of segments (on i-th level of the tree) corresponding to subset of users with
no failures. We will also use random variable X∗i to denote the number of aggregating
nodes on the i-th level of the tree. Let us begin with stating and proving the following
Lemma 3. Consider Binary Protocol with fixed κ and n. We call a node an aggregating
node, if it is used by the aggregator to obtain a sum of data from some subset of users.
We have the following formula for i > 1
EX∗i = EXi − 2EXi−1 = 2i ·
((
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) − (n− n2i−1κ )(n
κ
) ) .
Proof. First of all, we will call a segment in the Binary Protocol tree clean if and only
if there are no fails in this segment. Each node in the tree corresponds to a specific
segment, according to Binary Protocol rules. See that on a certain tree level, all nodes
correspond to segments of the same size, noted here by |Bi|. Throughout this reasoning
we will call the ’root level’ 0, children of the root are on level 1 and so on, up to level
log2(n) which is the ’leaves level’.
Data of each user is aggregated in exactly one node, which belongs to some ith
level and corresponds to a specific segment. This user generates a geometric noise with
probability βi, where:
βi = min
(
1
|Bi| ln
(
log2(n) + 1
δ
)
, 1
)
.
We want to know an expected value of the number of noises generated throughout the
whole protocol.
To do this, first we denote the number of ’clean’ segments of size |Bi| (corre-
sponding to nodes on ith level of the tree) by a random variable Xi. See that Xi ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 2i}. Furthermore, we see that:
Xi =
2i∑
j=1
Xi,j ,
where
Xi,j =
{
1, if segment j on level i has no fails,
0, otherwise.
This, and the fact that EXi,j = EXi,k for every j, k ∈ 0, . . . , 2i, allows us to use
linearity of expectation to calculate EXi:
EXi = E
2i∑
j=1
Xi,j =
2i∑
j=1
EXi,j = 2
iEXi,1 = 2
i · P (Xi,1 = 1). (1)
Now see that
P (Xi,1 = 1) =
(
n−|Bi|
κ
)(
n
κ
) ,
and also |Bi| = n2i , thus plugging these to (1) we get
EXi = 2
i ·
(
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) . (2)
Now let us consider the number of segments which really aggregate the data. See
that if a node is an aggregating one, that means that it corresponds to a clean segment,
but its parent does not correspond to a clean segment. We denote the number of ag-
gregating nodes on ith level by X∗i , we can also see that X
∗
i = Xi − 2Xi−1, where
i ∈ {1, . . . , log2(n)}.
There are Xi clean nodes on ith level but we have to subtract all the clean nodes from
higher level of the tree multiplicated by 2, because each of these clean nodes on a higher
level is parent to two nodes on ith level, which are therefore not an aggregating nodes,
because their parent is clean. That gives us
EX∗i = EXi − 2EXi−1 = 2i ·
((
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) − (n− n2i−1κ )(n
κ
) ) ,
which completes the proof of this lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 3 gives us an explicit formula for EX∗i . Now, when we have a formula for
the expected value of the number of aggregating nodes on each level, we can proceed
to calculating the expected value of the number of geometric noises generated during
the Binary Protocol.
Let Yi be a random variable which denotes the number of noises generated on ith
level of the tree. On ith level we aggregate X∗i segments, each of these segments have
2log2(n)−i users and each of these users generates geometric noise with probability βi.
Therefore we have Yi ∼ Bin
(
2log2(n)−i ·X∗i , βi
)
, where Bin(n, p) denotes binomial
distribution. After observing this, we can see that
EYi = EX
∗
i · 2log2(n)−i · βi.
Every user is aggregated only on one level, so if we take a sum over all levels of the
tree, we will get all the noises generated during the Binary Protocol. Let Y be a random
variable that denotes the number of noises generated. We have
Y =
log2(n)∑
i=0
Yi,
and we can also safely assume that if κ > 0, then Y0 = 0, because if at least one user has
failed, then we cannot possibly aggregate all users in the root of the tree. Furthermore,
using linearity of expectation and well known expected value for Binomial distribution
we have
EY =
log2(n)∑
i=1
EX∗i · 2log2(n)−i · βi =
log2(n)∑
i=1
(EXi − 2EXi−1) · 2log2(n)−i · βi.
After simple algebraic manipulations we can get
EY =
log2(n)∑
i=1
EXi · 2log2(n)−i · βi −
log2(n)∑
i=1
2EXi−1 · 2log2(n)−i · βi =
=
log2(n)∑
i=1
EXi · 2log2(n)−i · βi −
log2(n)−1∑
i=0
EXi · 2log2(n)−i · βi+1 =
= EXlog2(n) · βlog2(n) − nβ1EX0 +
log2(n)−1∑
i=1
EXi · 2log2(n)−i · (βi − βi+1) .
Also, as κ > 0, we have X0 = 0 with probability 1. These facts yield the following
result
EY = EXlog2(n) +
log2(n)−1∑
i=1
EXi · 2log2(n)−i · (βi − βi+1) =
= n ·
(
n−1
κ
)(
n
κ
) + log2(n)−1∑
i=1
2i ·
(
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) · 2log2(n)−i · (βi − βi+1) =
= n− κ+ n ·
log2(n)−1∑
i=1
((
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) · (βi − βi+1)) .
This gives us a formula for calculating EY and completes the proof of this theorem.
uunionsq
B Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. We fix δ = 0.05. First observe that for 24 6 n 6 221 we have
βlog2(n) = βlog2(n)−1 = βlog2(n)−2 = 1,
as for these levels we have 1|Bi| · ln(log(n) + 1) > 1. This means that users aggregated
in segments of length 1 and 2 generate noise with probability 1. Furthermore, for i 6
(log2(n)− 3) we have βi < 1. Also, for i 6 (log2(n)− 4) we have
βi+1
βi
=
|Bi|
|Bi+1| = 2.
Another observation is that we can get an upper bound for (
n− n
2i
κ )
(nκ)
in a following way
(
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) = (n− n2i )! · (n− κ)!
(n− n2i − κ)! · n!
=
=
(n · 2i−12i ) · (n · 2
i−1
2i − 1) · . . . · (n · 2
i−1
2i − κ+ 1)
n · (n− 1) · . . . · (n− κ+ 1) =
=
(
2i − 1
2i
)κ
· n · (n · −
2i
2i−1 ) · . . . · (n− (κ− 1) · 2
i
2i−1 )
n · (n− 1) · . . . · (n− κ+ 1) 6
6
(
2i − 1
2i
)κ
=
(
1− 1
2i
)κ
=
((
1− 1
2i
)2i) κ2i
6 e− κ2i ,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that (1− x) 6 e−x. We can use all these
observations to obtain a lower bound. Let β∗ = ln
(
log2(n)+1
δ
)
. Then we have
EY = n− κ+ n ·
log2(n)−1∑
i=1
((
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) · (βi − βi+1)) =
= n− κ− n ·
log2(n)−4∑
i=1
((
n− n
2i
κ
)(
n
κ
) · βi)+ (n−8κ )(n
κ
) · (1− βlog2(n)−3)
 >
> n− κ− n ·
log2(n)−4∑
i=1
(
e−
κ
2i · βi
)
+ e
8κ
n · (1− βlog2(n)−3)
 >
> n− κ− n ·
log2(n)−4∑
i=1
(
e
− κ
2log2(n)−4 · βi
)
+ e
8κ
n · (1− βlog2(n)−3)
 =
= n− κ− n ·
e− 16κn · β∗
n
·
log2(n)−4∑
i=1
(
2i
)
+ e
8κ
n · (1− βlog2(n)−3)
 =
= n− κ− n ·
(
e−
16κ
n · β
∗
n
·
(n
8
− 2
)
+ e
8κ
n ·
(
1− β
∗
8
))
>
> n− κ− n ·
(
e−
16κ
n · β
∗
8
+ e
8κ
n ·
(
1− β
∗
8
))
=
= n− κ− n ·
(
e−
8κ
n +
β∗
8
·
(
e−
16κ
n − e− 8κn
))
.
Which gives our lower bound for EY and finishes the proof of this lemma. uunionsq
C Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. We are interested in the absolute sum ofm noises, to estimate the error in Binary
Protocol. First, let Z be a random variable that denote the sum of noises. See that
Z =
m∑
i=1
Zi,
where Zi is a random variable with distribution Geom(α), where α = e

log2(n)+1 .
Let ϕZi(t) denotes the characteristic function of Zi. We have
ϕZi(t) =
(α− 1)2
α2 − α(et + e−t) + 1 =
(α− 1)2
α2 − 2α cos t+ 1 .
Let ϕZ(t) denote the characteristic function of Z. As Zi are i.i.d. random variables, we
get
ϕZ(t) = (ϕZ1)
m
=
(
(α− 1)2
α2 − 2α cos t+ 1
)m
.
We will use techniques comprehensively described in [6] to calculate expected value of
|Z|. We have a following
Fact 3 (From [6])
ϕZ+(t) = Ee
itZ+ =
1
2
[1 + ϕZ(t)] +
1
2pii
∞∫
−∞
[ϕZ(t+ u)− ϕZ(u)] du
u
,
whereZ+ denotesmax(0, Z), and the integral is understood in the principal value sense
(see [6]). Now see that
|Z| = Z+ + Z− = Z+ + (−Z+) = 2Z+,
which is true for symmetric Z. Fortunately, this is the case here. Furthermore, we have
E|Z| = 2EZ+ = 2
ϕ′Z+(0)
i
. (3)
We have to calculate the derivative of ϕZ+(t) at 0. It can be done in the following way
ϕ′Z+(0) =
ϕ′Z(0)
2
+
d
dt
 1
2pii
∞∫
−∞
[ϕZ(t+ u)− ϕZ(u)] du
u
 (0)
=
1
2pii
 ∞∫
−∞
[ϕ′Z(t+ u)]
du
u
 (0) = 1
2pii
∞∫
−∞
[ϕ′Z(u)]
du
u
.
(4)
We used the fact that ϕ′Z(0) = 0, because Z is symmetric. Moreover, because EZ
exists, then E|Z| also has to exist. That is why the integral has to be finite, so we were
able to use Lebesgue theorem to swap order of derivation and integration. We can derive
ϕZ(t) which yields the following
ϕ′Z(t) =
−2 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
(α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 . (5)
Combining (3), (4), (5) and observing that ϕ′Z(t) is an even function, we obtain the
following formula for E|Z|
E|Z| =
∞∫
0
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt,
which completes the proof of this theorem. uunionsq
D Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Let us define ω(t)
ω(t) =
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1
We have
E|Z| =
∞∫
0
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt =
∞∫
0
ω(t)
t
.
One can easily see that ω(t) is periodic with period 2pi. We can therefore consider
splitting the integral into [2kpi, 2(k + 1)pi] intervals and try to find a good lower bound
for this integral. We have
E|Z| =
∞∑
k=0
 2(k+1)pi∫
2kpi
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt
 .
Consider any of these integrals for k > 0
2(k+1)pi∫
2kpi
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt > 0. (6)
We will now explain why this inequality holds. First, observe that function ω(t) is an
odd function on interval [2kpi, 2(k + 1)pi]. One can easily see, that ω(t) is positive on
[2kpi, 2kpi + pi] and negative on [2kpi + pi, 2(k + 1)pi]. Furthermore, the absolute value
of ω(t)t is greater on the first half of the interval, because of the decreasing factor
1
t .
This yields (6), which is true for all these intervals, and we will use it for all k > 0, so
that leaves us with
E|Z| =
∞∑
k=0
 2(k+1)pi∫
2kpi
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt

>
2pi∫
0
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt.
Plotting this function shows that almost all of the mass is concentrated around 0, es-
pecially for α close to 1. We could use the lower bound (6), however there is no point
using it on the whole interval, because we would obtain trivial inequality E|Z| > 0. It
requires slightly more subtle handling. Clearly, we could use (6) for any interval of type
[pi − x, pi + x], for x 6 pi. This yields the following
E|Z| >
2pi∫
0
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt
>
ηα,m∫
0
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
tpi (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt+
2pi∫
2pi−ηα,m
4 · α ·m · sin t · (α− 1)2m
tpi (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt,
which is true for every ηα,m ∈ [0, pi]. Now see that if ηα,m < pi2 , we can bound the first
integral in a following way
ηα,m∫
0
4αm · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt >
ηα,m∫
0
4αm · cos t · (α− 1)2m
pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt, (7)
which follows from the fact that x 6 tanx for x ∈ [0, pi2 ). Furthermore
2pi∫
2pi−ηα,m
4αm · sin t · (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt >
2pi∫
2pi−ηα,m
4αm sin t (α− 1)2m
t · pi · (α− 1)2m+2 dt, (8)
which comes from plugging 1 instead of cos t, which makes the function greater in
terms of absolute value, but as it is negative on this interval, it yields a lower bound.
The function from (7) has an explicit anti-derivative. On the other hand, in (8) we have,
in fact, an integral of sin tt multiplied by a constant depending on α and m. There also
still remains a problem of choosing ηα,m. First we can observe that, for small enough
ηα,m we have
2pi∫
2pi−ηα,m
sin t
t
dt > −η
2
α,m
10
.
Obviously this holds for ηα,m = 0. Let Si(x) denote the antiderivative of sin xx . After
derivating left side we obtain
d (Si(2pi)− Si(2pi − ηα,m))
dηα,m
= −d (Si(2pi − ηα,m)
dηα,m
=
sin (2pi − ηα,m)
2pi − ηα,m =
= − sin(ηα,m)
2pi − ηα,m > −
ηα,m
2pi − ηα,m .
Derivating the right side yields −0.2ηα,m. We can check when the left side is greater
than the right side
− ηα,m
2pi − ηα,m > −0.2ηα,m ⇐⇒ ηα,m 6 2pi − 5
So for ηα,m 6 (2pi − 5) we have
2pi∫
2pi−ηα,m
sin t
t
dt > −η
2
α,m
10
Now we pick ηα,m so that
−0.1η2α,m ·
4αm
pi(α− 1)2 = −0.1.
That gives us
ηα,m =
√
pi(α− 1)2
4αm
.
Plugging it all to our formula for expected magnitude of noise yields
E|Z| >
ηα,m∫
0
4 · a ·m · cos t · (α− 1)2m
pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt− 0.1.
We are now interested in the lower bound for this integral. One can see that
ηα,m∫
0
4 · a ·m · cos t · (α− 1)2m
pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt >
ηα,m∫
0
4 · a ·m · cos(ηα,m) · (α− 1)2m
pi · (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt.
This inequality is just plugging the smallest possible value of cosine on this interval.
Furthermore, we have
ηα,m∫
0
4αm · cos(ηα,m) · (α− 1)2m
pi (α2 − 2α cos t+ 1)m+1 dt >
ηα,m∫
0
4αm ·
(
1− η
2
α,m
2
)
· (α− 1)2m
pi
(
α2 − 2α · (1− t22 )+ 1)m+1 dt.
This bound comes from the fact that cos t >
(
1− t22
)
. Let us call the integrand func-
tion g(t). This function has a following anti-derivative G(t):
G(t) =
4(α− 1)2m−2αmt
(
1 + αt
2
(α−1)2
)m (
1− η
2
α,m
2
)
2F1
(
1
2 , 1 +m,
3
2 ,− α·t
2
(α−1)2
)
(α2 + α(t2 − 2) + 1)m · pi ,
where the 2F1(a, b, c, z) denotes ordinary hypergeometric function (see [36]). One can
easily see, that G(0) = 0. That leaves us with
E|Z| > G(ηα,m)− 0.1.
Function G(ηα,m) is quite complicated, but we can greatly simplify it. Let us begin
with taking some of the G(ηα,m) factors
(α− 1)2m−2 ·
(
1 +
α·η2α,m
(α−1)2
)m
(
α2 + α · (η2α,m − 2) + 1
)m = (α− 1)−2 ·
(
1 +
α·η2α,m
(α−1)2
)m
(
α2
(α−1)2 +
α
(α−1)2 · (η2α,m − 2) + 1(α−1)2
)m =
=
(α− 1)−2 ·
(
1 +
α·η2α,m
(α−1)2
)m
(
1 +
α·η2α,m
(α−1)2
)m = (α− 1)−2 .
Furthermore, we can expand 2F1(a, b, c, z) into Taylor series around 0 in a following
way:
2F1
(
1
2
, 1 +m,
3
2
,− α · t
2
(α− 1)2
)
= 1−α(m+ 1)t
2
3(α− 1)2 +O(t
4) > 1−α · (m+ 1) · η
2
α,m
3 · (α− 1)2 .
Using these two observations we obtain
G(ηα,m) >
4(α− 1)−2 · α ·m · ηα,m ·
(
1− η
2
α,m
2
)
·
(
1− α·(m+1)·η
2
α,m
3·(α−1)2
)
pi
We can further simplify this by recalling that α = e

log2(n)+1 andm = γn and observing
that
(
1− η
2
α,m
2
)
·
(
1− α·(m+1)·η
2
α,m
3·(α−1)2
)
is increasing with n. Let us call this value c∗n.
We can fix this for the smallest n that we want to consider. See that, for example, for
n > 27 we have c∗n > 1.43. This leaves us with
G(ηα,m) >
4c∗n · (α− 1)−2 · α ·m · ηα,m
pi
=
=
4c∗n · (α− 1)−2 · α ·m ·
√
pi(α−1)2
4αm
pi
=
=
2c∗n ·
√
α ·m√
pi · (α− 1) >
2c∗n ·
√
m√
pi · (α− 1) =
2c∗n ·
√
γn
√
pi · (e log2(n)+1 − 1)
>
> 2c
∗
n ·
√
γn
√
pi · (e log2(n) − 1)
> ξ log2(n) · 2c
∗
n ·
√
γn

√
pi
,
where ξ is such that eξ·x 6 (1 + x) for x = ( 12 log2(n) ). For example, in case we have
 = 0.5 and n > 27 it suffices to take ξ = 0.96. In the end we have
G(ηα,m) > cn, · √γ · log2(n) ·
√
n

√
pi
,
where cn, = 2ξc∗n which is, for moderate n and , greater than 1.4. In fact, for  = 0.5
and n > 27 it is greater than 2. In the end we have
E|Z| > cn, · √γ · log2(n) ·
√
n

√
pi
− 0.1 ,
which completes the proof of this lemma. uunionsq
E Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let us note that S is not connected if and only if there exists a subset of nodes
from S with cardinality 1 ≤ k ≤ m/2 such that there is no connection to any of
remaining m − k nodes. For a given subset of S of cardinality k probability that no
edge connects it to other m− k nodes of S is (1− p)k(m−k).
Let Ak be an event that there exists such a "cut-off" subset of cardinality k. Clearly,
using union bound argument we get
Pr[Ak] ≤ (1− p)k(m−k)
(
m
k
)
.
Probability that S is not connected is equivalent to the event A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak for k =
1, . . . ,m/2. Again, using union bound
Pr[A1 ∪ . . . ∪Ak] ≤
m/2∑
i=1
Pr[Ai] ≤
m/2∑
i=1
(1− p)k(m−k)
(
m
k
)
≤
≤
m/2∑
i=1
(1− p)km2
(
m
k
)
= (?).
Since
(
m
k
)
6 mk we get
(?) ≤
m/2∑
i=1
(
(1− p)m2 m)k ≤ ∞∑
i=1
(
(1− p)m2 m)k = (1− p)m/2m
1− (1− p)m/2m = (??).
Since the function f(x) = a
xx
1−axx is decreasing for x > − 1log(a) (if 0 < a < 1) and
from the assumption that m ≥ n/2 we have
(??) ≤ (1− p)
n/4 n
2
1− (1− p)n/2 n2
.
Applying inequality exp(x) ≥ 1 + x and substituting p = 8 lognn we obtain
(??) ≤
exp
(
− 8 log(n)n
)
n
2
1− 1/2 = exp
(− log(n2))n = 1
n
,
which concludes the proof of this theorem. uunionsq
